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LoginMinister releases details of Mas Selamat's escape
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FUGITIVE terrorist Mas Selamat Kastari probably planned his escape over a period of time and seized the opportunity when a 'confluence' of factors gave him the break to flee from the Whitley Road detention centre on Feb 27, said Home Affairs minister Wong Kan Seng on Monday.
He gave Parliament a full account of the escape, based on the findings of the Committee of Inquiry (COI), which submitted its report to him on April 10.
The five-page executive summary of the report was also presented in Parliament.
The COI, said Mr Wong, had found 'no evidence of connivance or collusion' or any help given to the Jemaah Islamiah leader by anyone within the detention centre.
It took the Jemaah Islamiah leader under 11 minutes between 3.54 pm and 4.05 pm to make his escape - from the time he was brought to the toilet in the family visitation block and the time when the alert to his breakout was raised.
RELATED LINKS
Ministerial Statement
ExecutiveSummary
Mr Wong said he agreed with the COI's findings and accepted all its recommendations.
He added that he was satisfied that the three-member committee had done a thorough job.
Because of the sensitivity of the details, including the identity of the Internal Security Department and other security personnel and the precise work they do, he said the Cabinet has agreed that it is not possible to release the entire report 'without harming national interest and endangering the men and women who serve the nation'.
'We had also considered releasing the COI's report with the sensitive parts blacked out, but that was not feasible as the details are extensive. It would not only make understanding the report difficult, but also fuel the distraction of baseless speculation,' said the minister.
'However, we are very conscious that Members of this House and the public have a keen and valid interest in the findings of the COI. Hence, the Government has decided to release the executive summary of the COI report to show that the COI had carefully considered all the issues.'http://www.straitstimes.com/Latest%2BNews/Singapore/STIStory_229567.html
it seems like we're being told we're stupid again, hence, this kind of report
For us can k? You people are people who know best without doubt. Well done.
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yes, heard it over the radio while driving home a short while ago, and we are no closer to the truth. for a maximum security joint, the laxes they described are amateurish to say the least.
nothing new here. the juicy bit, they already say classified info already. guess they do not want to expose their world class cock-up here.
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Executive Summary
1. The Committee of Inquiry (“COI”) completed its inquiry into the escape of
Mas Selamat bin Kastari (“Mas Selamat”) from Whitley Road Detention
Centre (“WRDC”) on Wednesday, 27 Feb 2008. The COI submitted its report
to the Minister for Home Affairs on Thursday, 10 Apr 2008.
2. In the process of arriving at its findings and recommendations, the COI was
given unrestricted access to highly classified and security sensitive information.
The COI also received full cooperation from all relevant agencies.
Mas Selamat’s Escape
3. The COI finds that on Wednesday, 27 Feb 2008, Mas Selamat escaped from
WRDC between 3:54pm and 4:05pm. He was scheduled for his weekly family
visit from 4:00pm to 4:30pm. The family visit was to take place in an assigned
Family Visit Room, in a Family Visitation Block, at WRDC. As part of the
family visit routine, Mas Selamat was escorted by two Gurkha Contingent
(“GC”) guards and a WRDC Special Duty Operative (“SDO”) to a changing
room for him to change out of the WRDC-issued attire into his own civilian
clothes. Mas Selamat was then escorted to a toilet located next to the Family
Visit Room to shave and comb his hair as part of the family visit routine. After
entering the urinal cubicle inside the toilet, Mas Selamat closed the urinal
cubicle door. He flipped a pair of greenish-grey pants that he was wearing over
the concrete ledge above the urinal cubicle door, and turned on the water tap
inside this cubicle.
4. The COI believes that while inside the urinal cubicle, Mas Selamat climbed
onto the ledge located just below the ventilation window, pushed open the
ventilation window and squeezed himself through it. To help his descent, he
probably held on to a water pipe running vertically down the external wall of
the toilet. The COI received forensic evidence from CID that smudges were
found on the water pipe, although there were no conclusive fingerprints. A
packet of 7 rolls of toilet paper was found on the ground adjacent to the
external wall, which he could have used to break his fall when he descended.
5. Having climbed down the water pipe, Mas Selamat was on the ground at the
rear of the Family Visitation Block. There is no conclusive evidence of the
exact route Mas Selamat took to escape. However, the COI’s view is that Mas
Selamat was likely to have used a route 20 metres to the right of the ventilation
window [as one faces the perimeter fences from the ventilation window]. This
is where the inner and outer perimeter fences converged with the enclosed
staircase and walkway. Mas Selamat would have scaled the fence, climbed
onto the roof of the enclosed staircase and walkway, and jumped over the
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converged perimeter fences. In a re-enactment requested by the COI, a GC
guard took 49 seconds to climb out of the ventilation window in the urinal
cubicle, scale the fence, climb onto the roof of the enclosed staircase and
walkway, and jump over the converged perimeter fences.
6. The COI did not make any findings as to the route Mas Selamat took after
jumping over the converged perimeter fences. Pinpointing a specific route
would have been speculative, given the many possibilities and the lack of
evidence on this issue. Nonetheless, the COI asked for a re-enactment of the
shortest and most direct route from outside the converged fences to the Pan
Island Expressway. This attempt was made by a young investigation officer
and it took him 2 minutes 44 seconds to do so.
7. The COI believes that the 11 minutes between 3:54pm and 4:05pm would have
provided Mas Selamat with ample time to make good his escape from the time
he entered the toilet. This is notwithstanding the fact that Mas Selamat is older
and less fit than the GC guard and the young investigation officer who had
undertaken the re-enactments.
Factors Contributing to Mas Selamat’s Escape
8. The COI finds that Mas Selamat was able to escape because of the confluence
of a number of factors. These were:
_ The GC guard escorting Mas Selamat did not stop Mas Selamat from
closing the urinal cubicle door in the Family Visitation Block toilet;
_ The ventilation window in the urinal cubicle had not been secured by
grilles; and
_ The weakness in the perimeter fencing where the outer and inner perimeter
fences converged with an enclosed staircase and walkway leading to the
Family Visitation Block was not detected.
9. In addition, the COI finds that the following factors might have contributed to
providing Mas Selamat more time to make good his escape:
_ The two GC guards and the SDO escorting Mas Selamat failed to respond
immediately and decisively when they noticed Mas Selamat was taking too
long in the urinal cubicle;
_ The SDO escorting Mas Selamat failed to check if Mas Selamat had
changed out of his WRDC-issued attire into his civilian clothes. The COI
believes that Mas Selamat must have been wearing at least two layers of
clothing when he emerged from the Locker Room; and
_ No one was actively monitoring the two CCTV cameras covering the outer
and inner perimeter fences at the rear of the Family Visitation Block.
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10. The COI notes that no one individual had full control to bring about such
confluence of these factors at the material time. The COI finds no evidence of
connivance or collusion with or assistance given to Mas Selamat in his escape
on the part of any individual.
11. The COI is of the view that the routine use of the toilet in the Family Visitation
Block would have provided him with the opportunity to plan his escape. There
was evidence that Mas Selamat was testing the reaction of the GC guards by
closing the urinal cubicle door on previous occasions. This would also have
given him the opportunity to climb onto the ledge in the urinal cubicle to
survey the rear of the Family Visitation Block. The COI is also of the view that
by the time Mas Selamat was brought out of his cell on 27 Feb 2008, he had
intended to escape that day because he wore his WRDC-issued attire under his
civilian clothes when he emerged from the Locker Room. However, had the
confluence of factors not occurred on 27 Feb 2008, Mas Selamat would
probably have deferred putting his escape plan into action. Hence the COI
believes that Mas Selamat had pre-planned his escape over a period of time and
seized the opportunity provided him by the confluence of a number of factors
at the material time.
Post-Escape Response
12. The COI finds that the GC guards’ response following the discovery of Mas
Selamat’s escape at 4:05pm was sufficiently prompt and in accordance with
procedures. The GC Stand-to plan was immediately activated. The cordon
along Onraet Road was set up by 4:10pm, 5 minutes after Mas Selamat’s
escape was discovered.
13. The COI also finds that GC HQ’s response was sufficiently prompt. The GC
Wing Commander arrived by 4:30pm, within 20 minutes of GC HQ being
informed. The GC Trackers, who had been activated, arrived at 4.35pm.
14. After the alarm was raised, Whitley Road Complex (“WRC”) was locked
down. The inner and outer gates of WRC were closed and thorough checks
were conducted on all vehicles leaving WRC. ISD also sought Police’s
assistance to activate resources for search and to establish cordons and road
blocks around WRC at 4:20pm.
WRDC’s Operations, Systems and Processes
15. The COI examined WRDC’s operations, systems and processes in the
following areas: command and control, communications and coordination,
system of audits, training of GC Guards, joint planning and exercises, risk
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assessment of detainees, and policy on handcuffs. The COI also examined the
actions of various individuals vis-à-vis their responsibilities to assess whether
and how these had contributed to the operational lapses.
Recommendations
16. The COI’s view is that the custodial protocols and procedures of WRDC
detainees are generally sound. Detainees are secured in individual cells to
prevent them from communicating with one another. Different blocks are
linked via enclosed walkways to prevent detainees from familiarising
themselves with the layout of WRDC. Access within and across blocks is
tightly controlled to prevent detainees from escaping. When a detainee moves
within the WRDC compound, he is escorted by at least two GC guards, and his
movements are logged. The overall guard to detainee ratio in WRDC is much
higher than that in a Prisons facility to ensure tight security. GC guards are also
rotated regularly. This also prevents familiarity with detainees.
17. However, the COI finds some weaknesses in operationalising WRDC’s
systems and processes. To rectify these weaknesses, the COI recommends the
following:
_ Recommendation 1: ISD to assume overall command and control of
WRDC, including security.
_ Recommendation 2: ISD to establish a formal framework of
communications among the three functional groups (WRDC
Administration, GC guards and Operations Group) in WRDC that
supplements direct communications between officers from different
functional groups on the ground. Where instructions are given or changes
occur that have an impact on another functional group, they should be
communicated to the latter’s higher management formally, so that
appropriate Orders or Standard Operating Procedures (“SOP”) can be
updated and training programmes reviewed accordingly.
_ Recommendation 3: As WRDC is an ISD facility, ISD HQ must clarify the
responsibilities of officers in all three functional groups in relation to one
another. The Superintendent must ultimately take command and control
over WRDC’s day-to-day operations, and have oversight of the procedures
and practices of all ISD officers and GC guards deployed at WRDC.
_ Recommendation 4: ISD HQ, WRDC Administration and GC HQ to
establish a more structured feedback mechanism.
_ Recommendation 5: WRDC Administration and GC HQ to develop a
comprehensive training programme for WRDC staff and GC guards
deployed at WRDC.
_ Recommendation 6: WRDC Administration to develop a more structured
framework to communicate risks posed by certain detainees to GC guards.
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_ Recommendation 7: WRDC Administration to consider instituting a system
of regular audits to ensure that instructions are carried out and procedures
are adhered to.
_ Recommendation 8: ISD HQ to institute a system of checks and balances
through (1) Regular review of WRDC security by Protective Security
(“PS”) Command; (2) Process by which WRDC Administration must seek
proper security assessment from PS Command in writing before any change
in escort procedures or use of facilities by detainees is approved; and (3) the
Superintendent must obtain approval from Director, ISD before he
overrules any recommendation by PS Command.
_ Recommendation 9: WRDC Administration and GC HQ to jointly develop
a robust response plan for major incidents. Joint ground exercises should
also be conducted regularly to validate and improve these plans.
_ Recommendation 10: ISD HQ to consider having WRDC purpose-built
from design on a new site and to revisit its previous plans to co-locate
within the Changi Prison Complex.
Conclusion
18. The COI’s recommendations are made with the primary aim of addressing the
operational lapses that resulted in Mas Selamat’s escape, and improving the
overall system of security at WRDC, to minimise, if not eliminate, the risk of
future escapes. If accepted, there is a need to ensure the proper implementation
of these recommendations and periodic reviews of their continued
effectiveness.
Edited by eagle 21 Apr `08, 5:26PM
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aiya,i teach them the best way to not let a detainee escape from jamban la.
next time somebody use the cubicles, make him say aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa while he's inside.
then the guards can hear him wad.
provided he cannot get his hands on a recorder or what, he cant escape lo.
even if got recorder, there's still a difference, but i cant rly trust the guards.
see? i can b minister liao
Edited by ChoCoChips 21 Apr `08, 5:36PM
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Originally posted by ChoCoChips:
aiya,i teach them the best way to not let a detainee escape from jamban la.
next time somebody use the cubicles, make them say aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa while he's inside.
then the guards can hear him wad.
provided he cannot get his hands on a recorder or what, he cant escape lo.
even if got recorder, there's still a difference, but i cant rly trust the guards.
see? i can b minister liao
minister of toilet?
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Originally posted by joshua182:
No one was actively monitoring the two CCTV cameras covering the outer
and inner perimeter fences at the rear of the Family Visitation Block.
tapes tapes tapes where art thou?
It is wayanged in the ministerial statement pdf
"The COI also notes that the CCTV coverage of the area was in the midst of being upgraded to add motion-detectors. This was part of a major CCTV security surveillance system upgrade for the whole complex. At the time of the escape, there were two CCTV cameras mounted at the location where Mas Selamat climbed out of the Family Visitation Block. However, these camera were not commissioned yet as they were part of the CCTV upgrading and the system was still in its testing and validation stage. As such, at the time of the incident, there were no recording or active monitoring of these cameras. This is very unfortunate because if there had been operational cameras in the right places to record the escape, then we could have an idea as to how he got out of the WRC"
Edited by eagle 21 Apr `08, 5:38PM
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Originally posted by eagle:
It is wayanged in the ministerial statement pdf
"The COI also notes that the CCTV coverage of the area was in the midst of being upgraded to add motion-detectors. This was part of a major CCTV security surveillance system upgrade for the whole complex. At the time of the escape, there were two CCTV cameras mounted at the location where Mas Selamat climbed out of the Family Visitation Block. However, these camera were not commissioned yet as they were part of the CCTV upgrading and the system was still in its testing and validation stage. As such, at the time of the incident, there were no recording or active monitoring of these cameras. This is very unfortunate because if there had been operational cameras in the right places to record the escape, then we could have an idea as to how he got out of the WRC"
so qiao innit.
jus nice upgrade he jus nice escape.
unless he knows of the upgrade, but bor ko leng wad.
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Originally posted by joshua182:
No one was actively monitoring the two CCTV cameras covering the outer
and inner perimeter fences at the rear of the Family Visitation Block.
tapes tapes tapes where art thou?
according to ST(http://www.straitstimes.com/Latest%2BNews/Singapore/STIStory_229572.html)
There is no conclusive evidence of the exact route Mas Selamat took to escape.
meaning no tape...CCTV no capture...or they dun want to let U see.
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Originally posted by eagle:
It is wayanged in the ministerial statement pdf
"The COI also notes that the CCTV coverage of the area was in the midst of being upgraded to add motion-detectors. This was part of a major CCTV security surveillance system upgrade for the whole complex. At the time of the escape, there were two CCTV cameras mounted at the location where Mas Selamat climbed out of the Family Visitation Block. However, these camera were not commissioned yet as they were part of the CCTV upgrading and the system was still in its testing and validation stage. As such, at the time of the incident, there were no recording or active monitoring of these cameras. This is very unfortunate because if there had been operational cameras in the right places to record the escape, then we could have an idea as to how he got out of the WRC"
correct. this is mere excuses. no way will such centre will allow a gap or lapse in recording. even if it is being upgraded or something, there will be cover. all the more WKS need to take the rap.
he accepts the findings, so what's next? still no accountability from the woosie.
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Originally posted by redDUST:
correct. this is mere excuses. no way will such centre will allow a gap or lapse in recording. even if it is being upgraded or something, there will be cover. all the more WKS need to take the rap.
he accepts the findings, so what's next? still no accountability from the woosie.
He already expected this reply I guess
Do not misunderstand me. I mention these facts not to absolve or excuse the ISD from responsibility for its officers' mistakes or lapses. I mention these facts because we need to be fair and balanced in our judgement and not "throw the baby out with the bath water." Yes, this episode of Mas Selamat's escape is a bad mistake and officers who did not carry out their duties as required will be held accountable. But ISD, the organisation and the many dedicated and committed officers who continue to serve in it, are resolved to pick themselves up, recover their spirits and move forward relentlessly in their national mission. We must support them in this.
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Originally posted by eagle:
He already expected this reply I guess
Do not misunderstand me. I mention these facts not to absolve or excuse the ISD from responsibility for its officers' mistakes or lapses. I mention these facts because we need to be fair and balanced in our judgement and not "throw the baby out with the bath water." Yes, this episode of Mas Selamat's escape is a bad mistake and officers who did not carry out their duties as required will be held accountable. But ISD, the organisation and the many dedicated and committed officers who continue to serve in it, are resolved to pick themselves up, recover their spirits and move forward relentlessly in their national mission. We must support them in this.
Instead of "you must support us in this", he just has to say "We must support them in this."
Like that win le lor, he is totally not involve with it liao.
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